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THE ART OF INSINUATION: DEFAMATION
BY IMPLICATION
INTRODUCTION
The law of defamation has historically endured periods of systematic
constriction.1 Upon assuming jurisdiction of the action from ecclesiasti-
cal courts, sixteenth-century common-law courts circumscribed the tort
with restrictions to prevent defamation complaints from proliferating.2
Succeeding years brought further changes and restrictions, many of
which survive.3 The resulting body of law, fashioned out of historical
anomalies and vestigial rules,4 has recently been the focus of intense con-
stitutional scrutiny.
A burgeoning emphasis on free speech launched the most recent trend
toward restricting defamation.5 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,6 the
Supreme Court articulated a new standard7 that was intended to strike a
1. See W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 111, at 772-73 (5th ed. 1984). See
generally J. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 364-74 (2d ed. 1979) (his-
torical roots of defamation); 8 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 333-78 (1926)
(same).
2. One such restriction was the requirement that "temporal" damage be proved. If
the party was unable to make such a showing, then the action was simply a spiritual
matter for the church's consideration. See W. Keeton, supra note 1, § 111, at 772.
Where common-law jurisdiction was established by a showing of temporal damage, how-
ever, the parties were fettered with other constraints. See generally Lovell, The "Recep-
tion" of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 1051 (1962) (describing
historical development and resulting complexities of defamation).
3. See W. Keeton, supra note 1, § 111, at 772.
4. See generally id. at 771-72 (much in the law of defamation makes no sense); F.
Pollock, A Treatise on the Law of Torts 288-89 (1894) ("No branch of the law has been
more fertile of litigation than this.., nor has any been more perplexed with minute and
barren distinctions."); Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American
Law of Libel, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 63 (1983) ("The law of defamation should be stream-
lined, simplified, stripped of internal contradictions, and generally made more coher-
ent."). Smolla has proposed a reform that would abolish the distinction between libel and
slander and eliminate the special harm requirement. See R. Smolla, Law of Defamation,
§ 7.08(1)-(2), at 7-16 (1986); see also infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (discussing
distinction between libel and slander).
5. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 766-67
(1985) (White, J., concurring); W. Keeton, supra note 1, § 111, at 773; see, e.g., Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (requiring at least negligence in all defama-
tion actions); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) ("reckless conduct" for
purposes of actual malice not measured by whether reasonably prudent person would
have investigated before publishing); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155
(1967) (extending actual malice requirement to public figure plaintiffs); see also infra
notes 46-106 and accompanying text (cases disallowing defamation by implication).
6. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7. See id. at 279-80. The actual malice requirement was the first constitutional ele-
ment grafted onto the law of defamation. See M. Mayer, The Libel Revolution: A New
Look at Defamation and Privacy 1 (1987). It has not enjoyed an entirely friendly recep-
tion. One commentator believes that it grants the trier of fact too much discretion,
thereby permitting discrimination against unpopular positions and plaintiffs. See Oakes,
Proof of Actual Malice in Defamation Actions: An Unsolved Dilemma, 7 Hofstra L. Rev.
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balance between defending reputational interests and securing the first
amendment right of free speech.' The effect, though not the purpose, of
the actual malice requirement has been to limit the number of successful
defamation actions by public figures.9 Many decisions seem to have in-
terpreted this effect as correlative to its aim.10 The post-Sullivan trend in
defamation mirrors the tort's beginnings: defamation law has been read
with increasing strictness to limit suits."x As a result, courts have been
reluctant to find defamatory implications that arise from facially neutral
statements actionable.1 2
This Note analyzes recent cases' 3 in light of the issues and potential
655, 710 (1979). Others maintain that the standard places an undue burden on plaintiffs.
In Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883
(1986), the dissent observed that
[t]his judicially created limitation on libel actions has... no apparent relation-
ship to any change that has occurred in either the Constitution or society since
the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791. Libel is still libel. All that has changed
is the prevailing judicial perception of where the balance should be struck be-
tween libel plaintiffs and libel defendants ....
Id. at 1306-07 (Bowman, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
8. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-73. Sullivan's intent and its result may not coincide,
however. In Dun & Bradstreet, Justice White stated that Sullivan struck an "improvident
balance" between the public's interest in being fully informed about public affairs and the
plaintiffs' interest in vindicating their reputations. 472 U.S. at 767 (White, J., concur-
ring). He argued that the Sullivan standard has resulted in a stream of public mis-infor-
mation and in the unwarranted destruction of reputations. See id. at 767-69. One
commentator, arguing for a refined approach, suggests that the communications industry
should bear its share of the libel burden just as other industries pay the costs for the
harms they cause. See M. Mayer, supra note 7, at 15-16.
9. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 766-69
(1985) (White, J., concurring).
10. See infra notes 44-106 and accompanying text.
11. The constriction of defamation contrasts to the general trend in tort law of expan-
sive interpretation and liberal provision of remedies. See, e.g., Price v. Viking Penguin,
Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1446 (8th Cir. 1989) (court's decision restricting defamation "is an
anomaly in a time when tort analysis increasingly focuses on whether there was an in-
jury"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990); M. Mayer, supra note 7, at 8-9 (in defamation,
liability has been sharply limited, whereas in other areas of law liability has been
expanded).
12. See R. Smolla, supra note 4, § 4.05(3), at 4-16.
13. This Note discusses federal as well as state cases. Defamation is a state law claim
that does not command federal jurisdiction as a matter of course. Federal courts hear
defamation cases under pendent or diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Stevens v. Tillman,
855 F.2d 394, 395 (7th Cir. 1988) (principal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) supporting
pendent state law defamation claim), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1339 (1989); Woods v. Ev-
ansville Press Co., 791 F.2d 480, 481 (7th Cir. 1986) (defamation action predicated on
diversity jurisdiction); Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 501
(3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861 (1978). Analytically, the forum is irrelevant.
Practically, however, it may well influence the plaintiff's chance of success: one study
showed that defendants won 75% of the cases in federal court, but only 39% in state
court. See Goodale, Survey of Recent Media Verdicts, Their Disposition on Appeal and
Media Defense Costs, in Media Insurance and Risk Management 69, 73 (1985).
Theoretically, analyzing a defamation claim requires two inquiries. The threshold
question is whether the plaintiff's state-protected right to be free from injury to reputa-
tion has been violated. If it has, the court must determine whether the first amendment
[Vol. 58
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questions raised by defamation by implication. 4 Part I presents an ana-
lytic backdrop, describing historical impulses and conflicting policies in
defamation law. Part II draws on common themes that run through the
cases. Part III discusses relevant constitutional and policy considera-
tions, establishing that neither the Constitution nor precedent precludes
defamation by implication. It advocates that the fact/opinion test, used
to determine whether a constitutional privilege immunizes the challenged
defamation, be modified in the context of defamation by implication. Fi-
nally, it argues that the power of defamatory insinuations and the plain-
tiff's considerable disadvantage in challenging them compel recognition
of defamation by implication. The Note concludes that such an ap-
proach strikes the correct balance between protecting first amendment
principles and defending reputational interests.
I. BACKGROUND: HISTORICAL IMPULSES AND COLLIDING POLICIES
Defamation15 consists of twin torts, libel and slander.16 Libel is defa-
nonetheless precludes recovery. Because state tort law generally incorporates constitu-
tional analysis, federal courts cannot dissect their analysis neatly into a state law segment
and a first amendment segment. Cf. Pierce, 576 F.2d at 502 & n.19 ("no rigid line of
demarcation may be maintained between state law rules and constitutional norms").
Federal courts may also disregard state law in favor of overriding constitutional princi-
ples. In Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1983), for example, the court relied
on Restatement section 566, even though California had not adopted it, because the case
involved "a privilege that derives from the Constitution, not from state law." Id. at 555.
14. Courts use the terms implication, innuendo and impression interchangeably. See,
eg., Southern Air Transp., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 877 F.2d 1010, 1012
(D.C. Cir. 1989) ("impression"); Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069,
1092 (3d Cir. 1988) ("implications"); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson,
827 F.2d 1119, 1136 (7th Cir. 1987) ("impression"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988);
Church of Scientology v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1984) ("implication"); Hunt
v. Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631, 646 (1lth Cir. 1983) ("impression"); Pierce, 576 F.2d at
499 n.7 (discussing distinction between "implication" and "innuendo" and adopting for-
mer term); McNair v. Hearst Corp., 494 F.2d 1309, 1311 (9th Cir. 1974) ("impression").
This Note eschews the term innuendo because it has two possible, and widely differing,
meanings in defamation law. The narrow, technical meaning is associated with libel per
quod, which involves communications whose defamatory meaning must be established by
extrinsic evidence. The explanation of the communication's defamatory meaning in light
of these extrinsic circumstances is called an "innuendo." See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 563 comment f (5th ed. 1984). The second, commonly understood meaning of
innuendo is the implication arising from a literal statement. This connotation of innu-
endo is addressed here by the terms "implication" and "impression." Cf Brief for Appel-
lee at 60-61 n.63, Newton v. NBC, 677 F. Supp. 1066 (D. Nev. 1987) (No. 89-55220)
[hereinafter Brief for Appellee] ("impression" is preferable term where audiovisual me-
dium is involved) (on file at the Fordham Law Review).
15. Defamation is usually defined as a communication that tends to subject the plain-
tiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule or avoidance. See W. Keeton, supra note 1, § 111, at
773; cf. Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E. 217,
218 (1933) ("words which tend to expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contu-
mely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgrace, or to in-
duce an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive one of
their confidence and friendly intercourse in society"). Prosser and Keeton reject this
definition as too narrow and espouse the Restatement (Second) definition. See W. Kee-
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mation communicated by written words or other tangible representa-
tions,17 while slander is defamation by spoken words or transitory
gestures.1 8 Libel can be communicated by such symbolic expressions as
pictures, signs, statues and motion pictures.' 9 Even symbolic conduct,
such as hanging a plaintiff in effigy2" or signing his name to an egregious
piece of writing,21 may constitute libel. Traditionally, the form of the
defamation was not controlling.22 Thus, common-law courts did not dis-
ton, supra note 1, § 111, at 773-74. According to the Restatement, a defamatory commu-
nication tends to harm a person's reputation by lowering that person in the community's
estimation or by deterring third persons from associating or dealing with that person. See
Restatement, supra note 14, § 559, at 156.
16. This Note discusses cases involving libel, not slander, but is applicable to both
species of defamation. In theory, slander by implication and libel by implication are
equally possible. In practice, however, a claim of slander by implication would probably
be unsuccessful. Slander, unlike libel, generally requires proof of "special damages" in
the form of actual pecuniary loss. See Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N.Y. 54, 57 (1858); R.
Smolla, supra note 4, § 1.04(5), at 1-12 to 1-13, § 7.01-7.02, at 7-2 to 7-4. Proving that a
defamatory statement caused such loss is difficult, but proving that a mere insinuation
caused pecuniary loss would be formidable.
17. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines libel broadly as any "form of commu-
nication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed
words," Restatement, supra note 14, § 568(1), and enumerates the following factors to be
considered in classifying the defamatory speech: 1) its area of dissemination, 2) its "per-
sistence" and 3) the premeditated character of its publication. See id. at § 568(3). Under
the prevailing modem view, all broadcasts are treated as libel. See R. Smolla, supra note
4, § 1.04(4), at 1-11 to 1-12; Restatement, supra note 14, § 568A. This approach com-
ports with the policy underlying the libel/slander dichotomy. See infra note 18.
18. The policy underlying the distinction is to treat communications more likely to
cause serious harm (libel) separately from those less likely to do so (slander). See Re-
statement, supra note 14, § 568A comment a. Cardozo described the rationale with char-
acteristic fluency:
Many things that are defamatory may be said with impunity through the me-
dium of speech. Not so, however, when speech is caught upon the wing and
transmuted into print. What gives the sting to the writing is its permanence of
form. The spoken word dissolves, but the written one abides and 'perpetuates
the scandal.'
Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 39, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (1931) (citations omitted).
19. See Thayer v. Worcester Post Co., 284 Mass. 160, 162, 187 N.E. 292, 293 (1933);
Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 A.D. 376, 380, 152 N.Y.S. 829, 831
(1915); Monson v. Tussauds, I Q.B. 671, 676 (1894); Haylock v. Sparke, 118 Eng. Rep.
512, 512 (1853).
20. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 14 A. 425, 425-26 (Pa. 1888). This example sug-
gests two important exceptions in defamation law. The first differentiates assertions of
fact from statements of opinion. Opinion is generally not treated as defamatory, appar-
ently on the theory that personal convictions will be understood as such and hence will
not lower the plaintiff in the community's estimation. See W. Keeton, supra note 1,
§ 111, at 776; infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. The second exception renders
hyperbole non-actionable. See Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6,
14 (1970). Presumably, listeners will not be swayed by mere exaggeration. See id.
Hence, imposing liability would unjustifiably impinge on free speech interests.
21. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Hill, 356 F.2d 181, 187-88 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 973 (1966).
22. See Marion v. Davis, 217 Ala. 16, 18, 114 So. 357, 359 (1927); W. Keeton, supra
note 1, § 111, at 780; cf. Restatement, supra note 14, § 568(1)-(2) (defamation embodied
in physical form, spoken words, transitory gestures or any other form of communication).
[Vol. 58
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tinguish between implications and statements.2 3 Sullivan, however, con-
stitutionalized the law of defamation, inaugurating the most recent
trend toward constricting the tort.25 In this climate, courts are hesitant
to recognize defamation by implication.
Two conflicting but fundamental legal principles collide in the defama-
tion arena. One principle is the moral notion that individuals should be
protected from defamatory statements that impugn their reputations.26
State defamation law defends these reputational interests.27 The other
principle is freedom of expression, which is enshrined in the first
amendment.28
Application of the Bill of Rights to the states and greater emphasis on
freedom of speech have prompted vigilant use of the first amendment to
limit state defamation law.29 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3° a
23. See W. Keeton, supra note 1, § 111, at 780; Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiff's
Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 825, 847-48
(1984); Merrill v. Post Publishing Co., 197 Mass. 185, 193, 83 N.E. 419, 423 (1908);
Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N.Y. 369, 371-72 (1857). Possibly the oldest recorded case of
defamation by implication is Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio 347 (N.Y. 1845). Horace Gree-
ley, writing in the New York Tribune, explained that he was not perturbed by a suit
James Fenimore Cooper had filed against him because "[Mr. Cooper]... will not like to
bring [his action] in New York, for we are known here, nor in Otsego for he is known
there." Id. at 348.
24. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 766 (1985)
(White, J., concurring); R. Smolla, supra note 4, §§ 1.01, at 1-3, 2.01(1), at 2-4.
25. See Mihalik v. Duprey, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 602, 604, 417 N.E.2d 1238, 1239-40
(1981). Sullivan's insistence that there be a false statement of fact, see 376 U.S. 254, 279-
80 (1964), might be read to preclude defamatory implications. Many courts disallowing
defamation by implication seem to base their analyses on such an interpretation. See
Mihalik, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 605-06, 417 N.E.2d at 1240. A compelling argument can
be made, however, that such a reading attaches far too much significance to a word that
was chosen merely to reflect the facts of that case.
26. See W. Keeton, supra note 1, § 111, at 771; Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86
(1966); Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 861 (1978); Restatement, supra note 14, § 559. As Shakespeare ex-
pressed the sentiment,
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.
W. Shakespeare, Othello, in The Annotated Shakespeare 1841 (A.L. Rowse ed. 1984).
27. The interest in reputation is a "relational" interest, which involves community
perception rather than personal humiliation. Defamation occurs only when the defend-
ant communicates or "publishes" to third parties something that may affect their opinion
of the plaintiff. See W. Keeton, supra note 1, § 111, at 771. The plaintiff's own indigna-
tion or suffering cannot support a defamation action, but may constitute parasitic dam-
ages attached to an independent cause of action. See id.
28. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." U.S. Const. amend. I.
29. See Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990). Concurring in Rosenblatt v. Baer, Justice Stewart asserted
1990]
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landmark defamation decision, gave eloquent voice to the growing sense
that free expression about public matters by citizens and the press must
be guarded zealously,31 even at the occasional expense of reputational
interests. 32 Sullivan's imposition of the actual malice standard was moti-
vated by a conviction that debate on matters of public interest should be
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" even when it includes "vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials. ' 3
3
Where the plaintiff is not a public figure, the state's interest in protect-
ing the plaintiff's reputational interest is afforded greater weight. Unlike
public figures and officials, the private person has "relinquished no part
of his interest in the protection of his own good name."'3 4 Many courts,
however, have effectively interpreted Sullivan as asserting the primacy of
free expression over reputational interests.35 Consequently, they err on
the side of under-protecting reputational interests in their eagerness to
safeguard first amendment principles. 36 This trend37 is evidenced by de-
cisions discouraging or even disallowing claims of libel by implication.38
II. THE COMPETING APPROACHES
Some courts permit and others prohibit a cause of action for defama-
tion by implication. Unfortunately, they articulate their positions infre-
that the first amendment is not "the only guidepost" in state defamation law. He pointed
out that the "protection of the private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left
primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this
does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of
our constitutional system." 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966).
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. See id. at 269; Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 505
n.34 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861 (1978).
32. New York Times v. Sullivan instituted the celebrated "actual malice" standard,
which provides an additional burden that public figure plaintiffs must meet to establish a
prima facie case of defamation. Where the challenged remarks are directed at a public
figure's official conduct, even if they are defamatory and false, the plaintiff must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the remarks were made with "actual malice." See 376
U.S. at 279-80. This phrase does not denote animosity. See Price v. Viking Penguin,
Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1433 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990). Rather, it is
a shorthand term for knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity. See Letter Carriers v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 281-82 (1974). The standard focuses on the truth or falsity of
information in the defendant's possession; hence, failure to investigate cannot sustain lia-
bility unless the defendant already doubted the information's accuracy. See St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 733 (1968).
33. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
34. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). In private figure cases, the
states may impose any standard of liability they choose, except strict liability. See id. at
347.
35. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 766-67
(1985) (White, J., concurring); infra notes 44-106 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 44-106 and accompanying text.
37. Launched by Sullivan in 1964, this trend has been called the "libel revolution."
See M. Mayer, supra note 7, at 1.
38. See infra notes 44-106 and accompanying text.
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quently. Many courts that disallow defamation by implication do not do
so expressly. 39 Instead, they treat the claim as if it involved a facially
defamatory statement rather than analyzing it as a defamatory implica-
tion arising from a neutral expression. 40
Treating such claims as if they were identical to libellous statements,
however, misperceives their peculiar nature. It also results in improper
constitutional analysis. Courts generally examine the alleged defamation
to determine whether it constitutes opinion, which is protected under the
first amendment, or fact, which is not.41 Olman v. Evans, which sets
forth the most widely used version of the fact/opinion dichotomy, articu-
lates a four-part test for the court to use in distinguishing fact from opin-
ion: the factors are the statement's specificity, verifiability, literary
context and public context.42 However, the fact/opinion test is inappro-
priate in the context of defamation by implication. Its application to de-
famatory implications effectively precludes this species of defamation.43
A. Disallowance of Defamation by Implication
1. Explicit Rejection
In Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc.,4 the Eighth Circuit expressly de-
clined to recognize a cause of action for libel by implication.45 An FBI
39. See infra notes 58-106 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 58-89 and accompanying text.
41. While the distinction between opinion and fact is an old one, see W. Keeton,
supra note 1, § 111, at 776 n.72, the Supreme Court breathed new life into it in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc:
[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the con-
science of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (footnote omitted). Although these observations were dicta,
the distinction they draw between fact and opinion has been accepted as controlling law.
See Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1431 n.3 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
42. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978, 979-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). The test is designed to identify statements that, both in-
trinsically and contextually, function as unqualified assertions of fact rather than as ele-
ments of opinion. See Price, 881 F.2d at 1432. Whether it succeeds is another matter.
See Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 398-400 (7th Cir. 1988) (trying to separate fact
from opinion is "snipe hunt" that Constitution may nonetheless require), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1339 (1989). See generally infra Parts IIA, IIIB. Other cases have set out
similar tests. See, eg., Mr. Chow v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir.
1985) (context, circumstances surrounding statement, precision of language, verifiability);
Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 783-84 (9th
Cir. 1980) (context, cautionary words and circumstances, including medium of dissemi-
nation and audience).
43. At least one commentator believes that the fact/opinion dichotomy should be
applied in order to render defamatory implications non-actionable. See Note, The Fact-
Opinion Determination in Defamation, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 831 (1988).
44. 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
45. See id. at 1432.
1990]
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agent4 6 brought a libel action against the author and publisher of a book
about the Wounded Knee occupation and a subsequent shootout on the
Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota.47 His claim48 was not based on
any explicitly defamatory statements in the book, but rather on defama-
tory implications arising from facially neutral observations.49 The dis-
trict court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment" and
the plaintiff appealed.
Analyzing the claim as if it involved an overtly defamatory statement,
the Eighth Circuit applied Olman's version of the fact/opinion test5 to
determine whether the challenged "statements" were non-actionable
opinion. Having determined that the challenged assertions failed the
test's specificity prong, the court announced: "We do not recognize defa-
mation by implication." 2
In effect, the court created an additional hurdle for the plaintiff. To
establish a cause of action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the chal-
lenged defamation is specific.53 The defendant, however, need not show
46. The district court concluded that the plaintiff was a public figure and that the
alleged defamation related to his official conduct. See Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 676
F. Supp. 1501, 1511-12 (D. Minn. 1988), aff'd, 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990). The Eighth Circuit agreed. See Price, 881 F.2d at 1431. The
plaintiff thus had to satisfy Sullivan's actual malice standard. See supra note 33.
47. Peter Matthiessen's In the Spirit of Crazy Horse, written in a tenor sympathetic to
the Indian situation, urged a new trial for Leonard Peltier, the American Indian Move-
ment member convicted of killing two F.B.I. officers in the melee. Toward that end, the
author contributed a share of the book's profits to the Leonard Peltier Defense Commit-
tee. See Price, 881 F.2d at 1429, 1435.
48. Price also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, false light invasion of
privacy and prima facie tort. His request for $25,000,000 in compensatory damages, pu-
nitive damages, fees and costs led Viking to recall the book from circulation. See Price,
881 F.2d at 1429.
The district court dismissed some of the defamation claims under state law as well as
the emotional distress, privacy and prima facie tort claims. See Price v. Viking Press,
Inc., 625 F. Supp. 641, 645, 648, 650-51 (D. Minn. 1985), aff'd, 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990). Twenty challenged statements remained. They
suggested that the plaintiff suborned perjury, orchestrated the dismissal of charges
against a criminal suspect, withheld information during a homicide investigation and
harassed Indians. See Price, 881 F.2d at 1447-51 app. After four years of encyclopedic
discovery and exorbitant costs to both parties, the district court dismissed these remain-
ing claims on constitutional grounds. See Price, 676 F. Supp. 1501, 1515 (D. Minn.
1988).
49. See Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1437-44 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
50. See Price, 676 F. Supp. 1501, 1515 (D. Minn. 1988). The court found that the
plaintiff had not shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 1514.
The burden of proving actual malice with "convincing clarity" is applicable at the sum-
mary judgment and directed verdict stages. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 254 (1986).
51. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
52. Price, 881 F.2d at 1432 (citing Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1304
(8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986)); see also infra notes 58-70 and
accompanying text (discussing Janklow).
53. The court maintained that it could not reverse the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment unless the plaintiff showed that "precise factual statements were false."
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specificity to avoid liability.54 The practical result of this approach is
that a defendant who has defamed by implication, rather than by an ex-
plicit statement, is immune from liability.
Moving beyond the plaintiff's particular claims, the court analyzed the
case in light of its significance to "our nation's interest." 5 The court
explained that the first amendment compelled it to ignore certain injuries
to the plaintiff and instead require that he
do a great deal more than establish his disagreement with the book.
We have asked him to select what he finds objectionable, to explain
why it has a precise core of meaning, [and] to persuade us that it is a
factual matter capable of the jury's resolution ... .56
This burden effectively precludes defamation by implication."
2. Implicit Rejection
The Eighth Circuit explicitly articulated its position on defamation by
implication in Price, but adopted the analysis it had developed in two
earlier cases, Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc.5 and Secrist v. Harkin. 9 Like
Price, Janklow arose from the 1973 Wounded Knee occupation.' The
plaintiff was a former governor and attorney general of South Dakota.
He sued Newsweek for publishing an article discussing his relationship
Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1434 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
757 (1990). By definition, however, an implication lacks the requisite specificity. See id.
at 1439. Hence, under the fact/opinion test, a defamatory implication will always be
found to constitute non-actionable opinion. Those courts that analyze defamatory impli-
cations as if they were defamatory statements, in fact, invariably reach that conclusion.
See infra notes 58-89 and accompanying text.
54. See Price, 881 F.2d at 1432 n.4.
55. See id. at 1430. Apparently, a host of literati agreed: amicus curiae for the de-
fendants included William Styron, Kurt Vonnegut, John Irving, Alfred Kazin and Susan
Sontag. See id. at 1426.
56. Id. at 1446.
57. The plaintiff based his appeal to the Supreme Court on the inequity of this bur-
den. He argued that the circuit court had erected an "insurmountable hurdle" for plain-
tiffs in libel cases. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1990, at A18, col. 6. Under the fact/opinion test,
courts almost invariably interpret defamatory implications as opinion. See infra text ac-
companying notes 148-149. This is not to say that another result is impossible. See infra
note 64 and accompanying text.
58. 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
59. 874 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 324 (1989).
60. The incident resulted in a snarl of civil and criminal litigation. See, eg., United
States v. Peltier, 800 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1986) (denying plaintiff's motion for new trial),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1987); United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1978)
(affirming murder conviction), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979); Wounded Knee Legal
Defense/Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir. 1974) (claiming violation by
FBI agents of constitutional rights); United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 389 (D.S.D.
1974) (motion to dismiss), appeal dismissed sub nom. United States v. Means, 513 F.2d
1329 (8th Cir. 1975); Marshall v. State, 305 N.W.2d 838 (S.D. 1981) (affirming denial of
post-conviction relief).
Wounded Knee also triggered a literary eruption. See generally Price v. Viking Pen-
guin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1431, 1447 n.17 (8th Cir. 1989) (listing articles published about
incident), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
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with American Indian activist Dennis Banks, whom he had prosecuted
as state attorney general on felony charges arising from the occupation.61
Janldow claimed that the article libelled him by implying that revenge
motivated his prosecution of Banks, who had initiated charges of assault
against him in the tribal community.62
The district court granted summary judgment for the magazine, main-
taining that any such implication was non-actionable opinion.63 On ap-
peal, a divided panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the
defamatory implication inferable from Newsweek's article was "factual,"
and therefore actionable. 64 The court granted the plaintiff's petition for
en banc rehearing on whether the article's implication constituted fact or
opinion.
Affirming the district court's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice,
the Eighth Circuit held that the challenged implication was protected
opinion. 6 Noting that no bright line separates fact from opinion, the
court observed that the term "fact" need not have the same meaning in
every legal context. Rather, its given meaning "should depend on the
purposes of the law being applied."66 By sanctioning a protean definition
of "fact," the court licensed result-oriented analysis of the challenged
expression. Because "fact" will be viewed through the filter of the first
amendment, courts will find the challenged expression to be "opinion" in
order to further the first amendment's purpose. The Janklow court did
just this.
61. See Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1301. In a separate libel suit, the plaintiff followed
David Price's lead in suing Viking Penguin and Matthiessen for defaming him in In the
Spirit of Crazy Horse. The Supreme Court of South Dakota is scheduled to hear the case
in early 1990. The result in Price bodes well for the defendants, who have reportedly
spent more than $2,000,000 defending the book. See Edwin McDowell, Book Notes, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at C20, col. 3. If Janklow's suit is resolved in their favor, Viking
plans to recoup lost profits by publishing a paperback edition with an addendum describ-
ing the book's byzantine legal history. See id.
62. In fact, the prosecution preceded Banks's initiation of assault charges. See Jan-
klow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1303 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883
(1986). The article's chronology, however, suggested that the plaintiff began prosecuting
after Banks charged him with raping an Indian girl. The rape allegation was later ac-
knowledged as false. See id. at 1301.
63. See id. Having found that the article correctly and neutrally reported the mate-
rial facts of the allegation, the court held that any implication of revenge was opinion
protected under the first amendment.
64. See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 759 F.2d 644, 652 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 788 F.2d
1300 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986). The court based its holding
on the following findings: the article's language was generally that of a factual account;
the article's implication was not "broad, unfocused or subjective," but specific and fac-
tual; the article contained no cautionary language indicating that opinion, not fact, was
being presented; the forum, a news magazine, would indicate that the article offered
"hard" news. See id.
However, the panel upheld the district court's holding that the article accurately and
neutrally reported the facts. See id. at 647-49.
65. See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1305 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 883 (1986).
66. Id. at 1302.
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Although it applied the Olman test67 to determine whether the chal-
lenged implication was fact or opinion, the court concentrated on pro-
tecting the defendant's speech. This is evidenced by the court's finding
that the implication of revenge is not precise because "[ilt does not say in
so many words that Janklow's motive [in prosecuting] was revenge."68
Because nothing short of an explicit charge will satisfy this "in-so-many-
words" test, a defamatory implication would never support a defamation
action under Janklow's analysis. This result is consonant with the
court's apparent conclusion that free speech principles transcend any
other interests involved.
The dissent criticized the majority for failing to strike a fair balance
between Newsweek's media interests and the plaintiff's reputational in-
terests.69 It also challenged the court's broad definition of opinion:
[t]o the fortress of actual malice, the Court adds a virtually impenetra-
ble outer barrier built upon an extremely broad and elastic definition of
opinion.... I do not see any reason to extend absolute protection
under the First Amendment to statements that qualify as opinion
rather than fact only by means of judicial semantics .... 70
In Secrist v. Harkin,71 the Eighth Circuit refined the Janklow approach
and paved the way to Price's explicit repudiation of defamation by impli-
cation. In Secrist, a member of Senator Roger Jepsen's staff sued Jep-
sen's campaign rival for defamation.72 The plaintiff asserted that the
candidate's press release libelled him by implying that he actively solic-
ited funds for the senator in violation of the Hatch Act.73 The district
court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It held
67. See supra note 41.
68. Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1303 (emphasis added).
69. See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1306 (8th Cir.) (Bowman, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986). Concurring in a recent defamation case,
Justice White questioned this Sullivan-era balancing of interests, terming it "improvi-
dent." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767 (1985)
(White, J., concurring).
70. Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1307 (citations omitted). The dissent observed that Janklow
would probably have been able to make a strong showing of actual malice if the court had
allowed the claim. See id. at 1308.
71. 874 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 324 (1989).
72. See id. at 1247. Jepsen had hired the plaintiff, a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel,
through the Secretary of the Navy's intercession. The plaintiff's duties included helping
Iowa businesses obtain defense contracts. See id. at 1246. His appointment generated
sufficient controversy to emerge as a campaign issue the following year, when Jepsen's
challenger issued a press release questioning the senator's motives in securing the ap-
pointment. It implied that the appointment had increased Jepsen's campaign contribu-
tions rather than Iowa's share of defense contracts. It listed thirty-one companies, all
identified as defense contractors, that had contributed to the campaign. See id. at 1247.
73. See id. at 1247. The Act prohibits federal, state and local employees from con-
ducting certain political activities, such as participating in political campaigns or influ-
encing elections. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-02 (1988). The Uniform Code of Military Justice
mandates a two-year imprisonment for Hatch Act violations. See Secrist, 874 F.2d at
1247.
The plaintiff alleged that the following statements defamed him by implication:
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that the disputed portions of the press release were constitutionally pro-
tected opinion74 and alternatively, that the plaintiff had not proved actual
malice by clear and convincing evidence.75
The Eighth Circuit affirmed on appeal,76 finding that the statements'
public and literary contexts suggested opinion rather than fact. The
court further observed that "the challenged statements concerning fun-
draising are not so precise, specific, or verifiable that they can be equated
... [with] an accusation of criminal conduct."7 7 The court thus applied
the Olman factors to the statements themselves, not to their implica-
tions. Because the statements did not explicitly or precisely charge crim-
inal conduct, the court dismissed the claim.78 Hence, while a precise
charge of criminal conduct may be actionable as a statement of fact, a
veiled charge of criminal conduct, not precise or verifiable, is protected
as opinion.
In Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc.,7" the Third Circuit
foreclosed the possibility of a public figure recovering for defamation by
implication. In Pierce, a former Port Authority chairman sued a televi-
sion station for broadcasting a program that created the false impression
that he had misused his public position by seeking private pecuniary
gain.8° The program implied that the plaintiff had cast his vote on a Port
Authority bridge project to profit from reselling land he had acquired
near the bridge. It also insinuated that he had used his knowledge of
1) "A [P]entagon Marine Colonel assigned to drum up defense contracts for Iowa has
been more successful at raising money for Sen. Roger Jepsen's reelection bid" than help-
ing Iowa businesses obtain defense contracts.
2) The Jepsen campaign committee received 60% of more than $88,000.00 in defense
contractors' contributions after the plaintiff joined the staff.
3) The plaintiff is apparently successful "'at opening doors to defense campaign
money coffers on behalf of the Senator.'" See id. at 1253-54 (quoting defendant's press
release).
74. See id. at 1248.
75. See Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 124748 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
324 (1989).
76. See id. at 1253.
77. Id. at 1251.
78. See id.
79. 576 F.2d 495 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861 (1978).
80. The program, which aired three years after Pierce stepped down as chairman,
explored the Port Authority's activities and its new chairman's performance. Entitled
"Public Bridges and Private Riches," the program's thesis is aptly summarized in its own
introduction:
When Washington crossed the Delaware River, it was absolutely free. When
[our reporter] crossed the Delaware River, it cost him sixty cents. Washing-
ton's crossing brought us a nation. [Our] crossing brought us some incredible
findings that go right into your pockets. For 90 days now, [our reporter] has
traveled the bridges of the Delaware River Port Authority and the high speed
road to profit.... [B]ut hold onto your dollars. After this program you may
want to swim across the Delaware River.
Id. at 497 n.4.
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Port Authority projects in private real estate acquisitions.8 '
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, cit-
ing the plaintiff's failure to demonstrate actual malice."2 The plaintiff
appealed, arguing that the court erred in not fully considering the defam-
atory implications that flowed from the broadcast's language and
composition. 3
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.8 4 Criticizing
the plaintiff's concession that "no specific statement" was incorrect,85 the
court accepted the defendants' argument that treating the challenged in-
nuendoes as actionable defamation would undermine the first amend-
ment 6 and compromise Sullivan and its progeny. 7 Construing these
prior decisions broadly, the court demonstrated its unwillingness to
broaden the scope of actionable defamation to encompass defamatory
implications: "[b]eyond the details relating to the various statements in
the broadcast are fundamental principles of First Amendment jurispru-
dence compelling [our decision]."88 By characterizing the facts of the
case as "mere detail," the court signalled its adoption of a policy-moti-
vated analysis similar to that in Janklow.s9
In Lewis v. Time Inc.,9° the court was similarly unsolicitous of defama-
tion by implication. In that case, an attorney sued the publishers of Time
for defaming him by implication in an article on the legal profession.91
The district court, granting summary judgment for the defendants, held
81. See id. at 497-99. The plaintiff also challenged the program's title and introduc-
tion as defaming him contextually. See id. at 499-500 & n.8.
82. See Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 180, 187 (E.D.
Pa. 1977), aff'd, 576 F.2d 495 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861 (1978).
83. See Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 499 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861 (1978).
84. It held that no defamation had occurred and that even if it had, it was protected
on constitutional grounds. See id. at 504.
85. Id. at 509 (emphasis added). This focus on the statements themselves rather than
the statements' implications is further evidenced by the court's finding that the defend-
ants did not doubt the truth of any "remarks" in the broadcast. Id. (emphasis added).
86. See id. at 501, 510.
87. See Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 510 (3d Cir.),
cerL denied, 439 U.S. 861 (1978).
88. Id. at 509.
89. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
90. 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1983).
91. The article, entitled "Those 4#*X§!!! Lawyers," was the cover story on April 10,
1978. The plaintiff challenged a section of the article, subtitled "Ethics Enforcement,"
that referred to the profession's "shadier practitioners." See id. at 550. Representing the
plaintiff as a beneficiary of "painfully slow bar discipline," the article noted that he "is
still practicing law despite a $100,000 malpractice judgment against him in 1970 and a
$60,000 judgment including punitive damages in 1974 for defrauding clients of money."
See id. at 551. The district court, citing two state court judgments against the plaintiff for
malpractice and fraud, held that Time's references to the judgments were protected be-
cause they were true statements. See id.
The plaintiff's claim that the article defamed him by implication rested on the article's
general tone, as exemplified in the phrases "shadier practitioners" and "painfully slow
bar discipline." See id.
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that the article's general "negative inferences" were constitutionally pro-
tected expressions of opinion based on true statements of fact.92
The Ninth Circuit agreed.93 In characterizing the challenged implica-
tions as "opinion," the court relied on the test it formulated in an earlier
case, Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp.94 Like
Olman, Information Control essentially allowed the court to make a vis-
ceral determination of whether the challenged expression should be pro-
tected.95 Having decided that the challenged implications were "not the
kind of factual expression for which the Constitution permits liability to
be imposed,"9 6 the court summarily rejected the plaintiff's contention
that the offending phrases of the article must be read cumulatively. 97
92. See id.; infra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
93. See Lewis, 710 F.2d at 554-55. The court relied on the Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 566, which states that "[a] defamatory communication may consist of a
statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it
implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion." The
defendant argued that the implication that the plaintiff was a "shady practitioner" fell
within section 566 because it was based on stated, non-defamatory facts in the public
record. See id. at 555.
94. 611 F.2d 781, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1980). Information Control's inquiry into the
fact/opinion morass focuses on three factors: 1) the facts surrounding publication, 2) the
context of the statement and 3) the language itself. See id. Such contexts as "public
debate, heated labor dispute, or other circumstances in which an 'audience may antici-
pate efforts by the parties to persuade others to their positions by use of epithets, fiery
rhetoric or hyperbole' " are more likely to indicate opinion. Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d
549, 553 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596,
601, 552 P.2d 425, 428, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644 (1976)) (citation omitted). Language that
is "'cautiously phrased in terms of apparency' or is of a kind typically generated in a
spirited legal dispute" is, similarly, more likely to be opinion. Id. Applying the test,
the court determined that the facts surrounding the publication suggested that the article
was opinion because, even if it was held out as a factual account, it "did not purport to
dissect in detail Lewis's qualifications or lack thereof to practice law." Id. The court
found that the second factor pointed to opinion because the article made "an effort to
persuade readers ... that Lewis should be disciplined, and ... that lawyers in general
should be faulted for permitting attorneys like Lewis to practice without censure." Id. at
554. Finally, the court conceded that "the article was not part of a 'spirited legal dis-
pute' in which the 'parties are reciprocally attacked and defended,'" but asserted that
Information Control "does not state that expressions of opinion may be found only in an
exchange of views .... Such a doctrine would too often deny constitutional protection
for opinions expressed in the news media ... ." Id. (emphasis in original).
95. As the dissent in Janklow v. Newsweek observed, "the result to be obtained
through application of the Olman factors is in the eye of the judge." 788 F.2d 1300,
1307 (8th Cir.) (Bowman, J., dissenting), cert denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
Recognizing that these tests spawn inconsistency, the Supreme Court recently agreed
to decide how lower courts should distinguish between opinion and fact. See Milkovich
v. The News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191, cert. granted sub nom.
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 863 (1990) (defamation suit dismissed by
state courts). In Milkovich, a former high school wrestling coach sued an Ohio newspa-
per for publishing a report that he had "lied" at a court hearing on a 1974 post-match
fracas. The state courts had concluded that the reporter's statement was constitutionally
protected opinion. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1990, at A19, col. 2.
96. Lewis, 710 F.2d at 554.
97. See id. at 552. Another court rejected a similar argument. In Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., a psychoanalyst claimed that a well-known reporter, Janet Mal-
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Similarly, in Mihalik v. Duprey,95 a Massachusetts appellate court re-
fused to consider the overall defamatory impression created by a series of
true factual statements.99 The plaintiff, a school committee member,
claimed that a "riddle" published in the committee's newsletter"°° de-
famed him by implying that he misused his position for personal gain. 10
Denying the defendants' motion for a directed verdict, the trial court
instructed the jury that the truthful statements could support a defama-
tion action if they conveyed a defamatory impression when taken in con-
text. 102 The jury found that the riddle did convey the defamatory
impression that Mihalik had abused his position and that he had sus-
tained his burden of proving actual malice.10 3
Although the appellate court acknowledged that earlier Massachusetts
cases had imposed liability on defendants who had defamed through im-
plication, it maintained that Sullivan had invalidated this case law.' °4
Falsity0 5 cannot be established, the court held, by showing merely that
colm, had libelled him by fictionalizing quotes and deceptively editing his actual state-
ments. The plaintiff claimed that her article had the cumulative effect of making him
appear unscholarly and disreputable. See 881 F.2d 1452, 1453 (9th Cir. 1989). The
court, however, refused to consider the overall defamatory impression the article con-
veyed. See id. at 1456-63. Instead, it examined each challenged statement separately,
ultimately determining that the plaintiff had not shown actual malice. See id. This deci-
sion was sharply criticized for allowing scholars to falsify quotations. See Schlesinger,
The Judges of History Rule, Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1989, at A16, col. 3; Manhattan Lawyer,
Aug. 15-Aug. 21, 1989, at 10.
98. 11 Mass. App. Ct. 602, 417 N.E.2d 1238 (1981).
99. See id. at 606, 417 N.E.2d at 1241; cf. Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569
S.W.2d 412, 420 (Tenn. 1978) (literal truth of individual statements no defense to defa-
mation action).
This reluctance to weigh the overall impact of the defamatory communication departs
from the traditional rule that it be construed as a whole. See Houston v. Interstate Cir-
cuit, 132 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); W. Keeton, supra note 1, § 111, at 781-
82; Note, Recent Cases, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 78, 98-100 (1946).
100. The riddle read as follows:
[C]lue 1. Which elected city official does not live within.., the ward from
which he was elected? [C]lue 2. This person does not have children in the
public schools .... [C]lue 3. He went from provisional city employee to fore-
man almost overnight. [C]lue 4. He is having the Trade School make him furni-
ture for his home. [C]lue 5. It's not the fence watcher. Answer next news
letter, maybe.
Mihalik, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 602-03, 417 N.E.2d at 1239 (brackets in original).
101. See id. at 603, 417 N.E.2d at 1239.
102. See Mihalik v. Duprey, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 602, 603, 417 N.E.2d 1238, 1239
(1981).
103. See id., 417 N.E.2d at 1239.
104. See id. at 607, 417 N.E.2d at 1241. The court also acknowledged that in "other
contexts such individually truthful, but inadequately explained, statements might collec-
tively be found to have amounted to a 'half truth ... tantamount to a falsehood.'" Id. at
604, 417 N.E.2d at 1239 (quoting Swinton v. Whitinsville Say. Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 678,
42 N.E.2d 808, 808 (1942)) (emphasis added). However, the court ruled that such an
approach was inappropriate in the context of public figure defamation as demarcated by
Sullivan. See id. at 606, 417 N.E.2d at 1240-41.
105. In a 1986 case, the Supreme Court reworked the requirements of proving falsity.
The Court held that where the libel action involves a matter of public concern, "a private-
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the cumulative effect of the statements created a defamatory
"overtone."' 0 6
B. Allowance of Defamation by Implication
1. Explicit Allowance
Other courts have concluded that defamation by implication is a valid
cause of action. 10 7 In Woods v. Evansville Press Co., ° s a television sta-
tion owner sued a newspaper and its parent corporation' 9 for libelling
him in an article." 0 The plaintiff claimed that the column falsely implied
that he was dishonest, indebted and religionistic."I The district court
figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements at issue
are false." Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 769 (1986). This
reverses the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false. See Corabi v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 449-50, 273 A.2d 899, 908 (1971); Restatement, supra
note 14, § 581A comment b. Writing for the majority in Philadelphia Newspapers, Justice
O'Connor explained that "two forces" are particularly important: whether the plaintiff is
a public figure and whether the speech is of public concern. See Philadelphia Newspapers,
475 U.S. at 775. If the plaintiff is a public figure and raises an issue of public concern, he
must prove scienter and falsity under Sullivan. See id. If the plaintiff is a private figure
but raises an issue of public concern, then Gertz applies, see id., and the plaintiff must
prove at least negligence and falsity to recover actual damages. If the plaintiff is a private
figure and raises no issue of public concern, then the Constitution does "not necessarily
force any change in at least some of the.., common-law landscape." Id.
106. See Mihalik v. Duprey, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 602, 606, 417 N.E.2d 1238, 1241
(1981); infra notes 140-49 and accompanying text; accord Schaefer v. Lynch, 406 So. 2d
185, 188 (La. 1981) ("Even though a false implication may be drawn by the public, there
is no redress for its servant. Where public officers and public affairs are concerned, there
can be no libel by innuendo."); Gouthro v. Gilgun, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 594, 427
N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (1981) (statements are "too vague" to support defamation action
predicated on defamatory overtone), review denied, 385 Mass. 1101, 440 N.E.2d 1173
(1982). For insightful criticism of Mihalik and Schaefer, see Franklin & Bussel, supra
note 23, at 848-51. Compare Pietrafeso v. D.P.I., Inc., 757 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1988) ("if the allegedly libelous statements are true, there can be no libel by innu-
endo of a public figure") and Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313,
326, 477 A.2d 1005, 1012 (1984) ("The media would be unduly burdened if... it had to
be vigilant for any possibly defamatory implication arising from the report of ... true
facts.") with Dunlap v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 301 Pa. Super. 475, 490-93, 448
A.2d 6, 14-16 (1982) (true facts leading to a false inference are actionable) and Locricchio
v. Evening News Ass'n, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1473, 1476 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)
(plaintiffs not required to base defamation claims on specific false statements).
107. See infra notes 108-130 and accompanying text.
108. 791 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1986).
109. The court ultimately dismissed the complaint against the newspaper's parent
company on jurisdictional grounds. See id. at 483.
110. The article's author, Kenneth Wayne McManus, was the paper's regular colum-
nist on media issues. Between December 1980 and June 1981, he devoted all or part of
twenty-three columns to matters concerning the plaintiff's station, Channel 7. In June
1981, he interviewed one of the station's newscasters, William E. FitzGerald III, who was
unsatisfied with changes in programming and station policies implemented after the
plaintiff's purchase of Channel 7. The challenged column consisted almost wholly of
FitzGerald's statements regarding the plaintiff's management of the station and his per-
sonal predictions of future changes. See id. at 481-82.
111. See id. at 483. He did not assert that the column contained any facially defama-
tory statements. See id. at 486.
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granted the newspaper's motion for summary judgment because the
plaintiff had failed to prove actual malice.1 12
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declaring that "[a]n implied statement,
just as a statement made in direct language, can be defamatory." '113 Nev-
ertheless, the court found no evidence that the defendants intended the
defamatory implications the plaintiff attributed to the article: while the
evidence suggested that the column could reasonably be interpreted as
defamatory, it was "insufficient to create a triable issue" that the defend-
ants acted with actual malice. 14
The plaintiff in Saenz v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc.115 also won a Pyrrhic
victory. While the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its position that defama-
tion by implication is a valid cause of action, it found that the plaintiff
112. See Woods v. Evansville Press Co., 791 F.2d 480, 489 (7th Cir. 1986). Although
he was deemed a private figure, state law subjected the plaintiff to the actual malice stan-
dard because he based his suit on a matter of public interest. See id. at 483; supra notes
32, 34. The district court suggested that the defendants' motion for summary judgment
had to be granted if the plaintiff had not shown actual malice with convincing clarity. See
Woods, 791 F.2d at 485. On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that the court had misapplied
the burden-of-proof standard. The Seventh Circuit noted the court's apparent suggestion
that the plaintiff must prove his case at the summary judgment stage, which would
amount to a trial on the merits. See id. Nonetheless, the court did not resolve the issue
of whether the district court had in fact required the plaintiff to prove actual malice with
convincing clarity, or whether it had appropriately required that he establish the exist-
ence of a triable issue of fact. Instead, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the record de novo.
See id. at 486.
Appellate courts have the duty to make an independent examination of the whole rec-
ord to ensure that "the [lower court's] judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion
on the field of free expression." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285
(1964); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499
(1984) (reaffirming independent appellate review doctrine); Note, Amplifying Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union: The Proper Scope of De Novo Appellate Review in Public Person
Defamation Cases, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 579 (1989) (discussing constitutionally mandated
plenary appellate review of actual malice determinations). Whether the doctrine applies
only to factual determinations favoring the defendant, or extends to those favoring the
plaintiff, is unclear. See R. Smolla, supra note 4, § 12.09(3), at 12-41 to 12-42.
113. Woods, 791 F.2d at 486.
114. Id. at 487. Extrapolating from Sullivan's refusal to compel a publisher to guaran-
tee the truth of his statements, the court determined that a publisher reporting on matters
of public interest cannot be burdened with predicting and then negating all possible de-
famatory inferences a jury might draw from an article. See id. at 487-88. Because the
plaintiff was unable to show that the inferences he drew from the column were the only
reasonable ones, or that the author shared his reading, the court found that he had not
sustained his burden of proof. See id. at 486-87.
Simply because a statement reasonably can be read to contain a defamatory
inference does not mean... that this inference is the only reasonable one that
can be drawn from the article. Nor does it mean that the publisher of the state-
ment either intended [it] to contain such a defamatory implication or even knew
that readers could reasonably interpret the statement to contain the defamatory
implication.
Id. at 487. The court observed that the result in the case may have been different if the
column carried only those implications that the plaintiff reasonably ascribed to it or if
there was evidence that the author harbored animosity toward the plaintiff. See id. at
488.
115. 841 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
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had not sustained the burden of proving actual malice.1 16
In Saenz, a Secretary of New Mexico's Department of Corrections
sued Playboy magazine for defaming him in "Thirty-Six Hours at Santa
Fe," an article discussing a 1980 riot at the New Mexico State Peniten-
tiary. He alleged that the article falsely implied that he had been in-
volved in torturing political dissidents during his tenure as an official in
the United States Office of Public Safety.1 17
Drawing upon Sullivan and Rosenblatt, the district court determined
that a public official premising his defamation claim on statements that
critically assess government must show "'an explicit charge' 'specifically
directed' at him." ' 8 Because the plaintiff based his claim on defamatory
implications, not defamatory declarations, the district court deemed his
allegations insufficient to disrupt the article's first amendment protec-
tion.1 19 The court sweepingly held that a public official may never estab-
lish defamation by implication where the inferences are drawn from
statements that also critically evaluate governmental conduct. 120
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the
ground that a reasonable jury could not find that the plaintiff had demon-
strated actual malice with convincing clarity.1 21 Nonetheless, the court
criticized the district court for requiring that the defamatory assertions
specifically and explicitly libel the plaintiff.t 22 As the Saenz court noted,
imposing a burden beyond actual malice on public figures who base their
suits on defamatory implications is inequitable:
[it] denies [them] the opportunity to demonstrate defamatory infer-
ences that are as clear and perhaps more damaging because of their
116. See id. at 1314-16, 1318-20.
117. See id. at 1311. The Office of Public Safety ("OPS"), an offshoot of the State
Department, was established after World War II to help under-developed countries es-
tablish democratic criminal justice procedures. The plaintiff directed OPS operations in
Uruguay from 1965 to 1969 and in Panama from 1970 to 1973. Responding to rampant
and documented charges that the agency and its International Police Academy condoned
and perhaps facilitated the torture of foreign citizens, Congress disbanded the OPS in
1975. See id.
Twelve paragraphs of the article detailed the plaintiff's career at OPS. He alleged that
the discussion, which was not explicitly defamatory, implied that he advised foreign po-
lice on suppressing political dissent and conspired in torture and other constabulary
atrocities. See id. at 1312-13.
118. Saenz v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 552, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (quot-
ing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 81 (1966)), aff'd, 841 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988). The
court candidly acknowledged the novelty of this approach, but found it justified by the
first amendment. See id. at 562.
119. See id. at 561-62.
120. See id. at 562; infra notes 138-147 and accompanying text.
121. See Saenz v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1319-20 (7th Cir. 1988).
122. See id. at 1314. The three-judge panel, noting that the district court gave an
overly solicitous reading to Sullivan and Rosenblatt, observed that those cases protected
but did not immunize political speech: "'[like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of un-
lawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business .... libel can
claim no talismatic [sic] immunity from constitutional limitations.'" Id. (quoting New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
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unlimited nature than even explicitly defamatory charges.... Such a
rule goes too far; it invokes the spectre of heinous abuse by crafty and
mischievous authors whose subtle art of insinuation is honed for
destruction. 
123
The court further observed that disallowing defamation by implication
has two undesirable effects: it exposes public figures to inexplicit but
clearly discernible slurs and promotes sensationalist journalism that
makes no meaningful contribution to public debate. 124
2. Implicit Allowance
In Newton v. National Broadcasting Co.,125 the court determined that
constitutional considerations did not compel dismissal of the plaintiff's
claim of defamation by implication. 26 Newton's claim survived the de-
fendant's summary judgment motion and reached the jury.
Newton sued NBC for allegedly defaming him in a Nightly News Spe-
cial Segment called "Wayne Newton and the Law." He claimed that the
broadcast, consisting of facially non-defamatory observations, implied
that the Mafia had financed his acquisition of a Las Vegas hotel.127 The
123. Id. Appellants in Newton v. NBC quoted this language in their appellate brief,juxtaposing its fervent, expansive rhetoric with the systematic, analytical prose of their
brief to make the court's position on defamation by implication seem immoderate. See
Brief for Appellants at 38 n.37, Newton v. NBC, 677 F. Supp. 1066 (D. Nev. 1987) (Nos.
89-55220, 89-55285) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants] (on file at the Fordham Law Re-
view); see also infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text (discussing Newton).
124. See Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1317. In dictum, the court concluded that whether the
article impliedly defamed the plaintiff was a "constitutionally permissible" question for
the jury and observed that nothing in Sullivan or Rosenblatt suggested the contrary. See
id. at 1315; see also infra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing Rosenblatt).
Another court reached a similar result. In Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639
F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980), the mayor of Providence, Rhode Island sued a newspaper for
publishing a story that implicitly accused him of rape and bribery. The district court
dismissed his claim, asserting that the article was not defamatory because it did not make
its accusations explicit. See id. at 59. Further, the court held that any implication that
Cianci had committed rape or bribed the victim was constitutionally protected opinion.
See id. The Second Circuit disagreed, finding the story's implications potentially defama-
tory. See id. at 60-61. As Judge Friendly asserted, "[a] statement that Cianci raped [the
alleged victim] at gunpoint twelve years ago and then paid her in an effort to obstructjustice falls within the Court's explication of false statements of fact rather than its illus-
trations of false ideas where public debate is the best solvent." Id. at 62. The court
reversed and remanded for trial. See id. at 71. Thereafter, Cianci's action was reportedly
settled. See M. Mayer, supra note 7, at 96.
125. 677 F. Supp. 1066 (D. Nev. 1987).
126. See id. at 1067. If the court had found that the challenged implications consti-
tuted privileged opinion, it could not have submitted the claim to the jury. In the opinion
upholding the jury's verdict, the court made this determination explicit. See id.
127. See id.; Brieffor Appellants, supra note 123, at 34.
The plaintiff also claimed that the broadcast implied that he had close ties to organized
crime figures and that he was not revealing the "whole story" about these affiliations to
federal authorities. See id. The court ultimately found that the defendants knew that
these implications were defamatory because assigning hidden interests in gaming casinos
and committing peujury are illegal. See Newton, 677 F. Supp. at 1067-68.
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jury found that Newton had been defamed by implication.12 The court
upheld the verdict and denied the defendant's motion for judgment
n.o.v. 129 Calling the broadcast's implications "clear and inescapable,"
the court found that the plaintiff had shown actual malice: because the
defendant voluntarily edited the program's audiovisual elements to cre-
ate defamatory impressions, the jury properly found that the defendant
had serious subjective doubts about the truth of the broadcast as well as
intent to defame the plaintiff. 3 °
128. See id. at 1067-68; Brieffor Appellants, supra note 123, at 5. The jury returned a
special verdict against NBC and the three NBC journalists who created the segment. It
found that all three individual defendants intentionally conveyed a false and defamatory
factual impression of Newton with actual malice. The jury awarded Newton
$22,757,273, including loss of past and future income, damages for reputational injury
and for physical and mental suffering, exemplary damages and pre-judgment interest.
The appellants claim that this is the largest jury verdict in a libel case against a news
organization "in the history of this nation." See Brieffor Appellants, supra note 123, at 3.
But see infra note 129 (final award cut by three-quarters); cf Brief for Appellee, supra
note 14, at 83 (award not excessive because it equals only one-quarter of one percent of
NBC's worth).
129. See Newton v. NBC, 677 F. Supp. 1066, 1068 (D. Nev. 1987). The court did,
however, give judgment non obstante veredicto on the jury's award of $9,046,750 for the
plaintiff's loss of past and future earnings, ruling that Newton had failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the challenged broadcast had caused the loss. See id.
at 1069. The court also directed Newton to file a remittitur of all but $50,000 of the
$5,000,000 jury award for reputational injury, stating that the original award shocked the
court's conscience because the broadcasts "did not tarnish [the plaintiff's] outstanding
reputation." See id. at 1068. The resulting award amounted to $5,275,000. See id. at
1069.
130. See id. at 1067. The defendants have appealed to the Ninth Circuit, asserting that
the district court erred in denying their motion for a directed verdict on the issue of
liability. See Brieffor Appellants, supra note 123, at I (submitted in August 1989). They
contend that precedent bars recovery by public figures for defamation by implication. See
id. at 35. The plaintiffs, however, point out that defamation by implication is not a new
cause of action, but one that the Ninth Circuit has long recognized. See Brieffor Appel-
lee, supra note 14, at 61. In Church of Scientology v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694 (9th Cir.
1984), the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See id. at 698. The deci-
sion could not be upheld "if 'by reasonable implication a defamatory meaning may be
found in the communication.'" Id. at 696 (quoting Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792,
806, 608 P.2d 716, 723, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628, 635 (1980)). Because the jury could reason-
ably have inferred such a defamatory meaning from the defendant's remarks, the court
held that the plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and re-
manded to the lower court. See id. at 696-98. In an earlier case, McNair v. Hearst Corp.,
494 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1974), the court reached a similar conclusion. It reversed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant, finding that the allegedly
defamatory implications of a newspaper story's headline and first two paragraphs could
sustain a cause of action for defamation. See id. at 1311.
[Vol. 58
DEFAMATION B Y IMPLICATION
III. BALANCING THE EQUITIES: PERMITTING DEFAMATION
BY IMPLICATION
A. Constitutional Considerations Do Not Compel Disallowing
Defamation by Implication
Courts disallowing defamation by implication construe Sullivan and its
progeny as having established a general constitutional disapproval of ex-
panding the scope of defamation. While these cases limit defamation in
certain respects, they do not suggest that the Constitution immunizes
defendants who defame implicitly. 31 Disallowing a cause of action for
defamatory implications is a draconian response to a supposed prolifera-
tion of defamation actions1 32 and an unnecessary encroachment on a
state-created right.
1 33
Sullivan and succeeding cases sought to stem this tide of defamation
suits by restricting the right to legal redress for reputational injury, an
approach that may not accord with the original intent of the first
amendment:1
3 4
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he
pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of
the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal,
he must take the consequence of his own temerity.... [Thus no] re-
straint [is] hereby laid upon freedom of thought or enquiry: liberty of
private sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making public, of
bad sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which
society corrects.
1 35
Cases disallowing defamation by implication carry this trend further by
subordinating the individual's reputational interests to the defendant's
131. See Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351 (Colo. 1983); Buratt
v. Capital City Press, Inc., 399 So. 2d 687 (La. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd, 459 So. 2d 1268
(La. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817 (1985); Franklin & Bussel, supra note 23, at 848,
850.
132. Cf. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring)
(referring to concern about "freshening stream of libel actions"), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1127 (1985).
Then-judge Scalia's eloquent discussion of unnecessary judicial activism in first amend-
ment jurisprudence bears on the problem at hand:
What is under discussion here is not application of preexisting principles to new
phenomena, but rather alteration of preexisting principles... on the basis of
judicial perception of changed social circumstances. The principle that the first
amendment does not protect the deliberate impugning of character or reputa-
tion ... is to be revised... because we perceive that libel suits are now too
common and too successful.
Id. at 1038 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
133. See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1307-08 (8th Cir.) (Bowman, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
134. See id. at 1306-07 n.1 (Bowman, J., dissenting).
135. Id. (quoting IV W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 151-52
(1967) (reproduction of 1772 American edition)). The court observed that Blackstone's
view of libel, "contemporaneous with that of the Founding Fathers," diverges from the
position adopted in Sullivan. Id.
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first amendment rights.136 Precedent dictates no such expansion of first
amendment rights. In fact, the Rosenblatt Court suggested that a public
figure could base a claim on implicit defamatory charges, provided he
demonstrate that the assertions were made "of and concerning" him.137
An argument for disallowing defamation by implication is that Sulli-
van and succeeding cases precluded defamation claims based on defama-
tory implications that arise from true statements of fact.138  This
argument confuses defamatory statements and defamatory implications,
however, and many courts have correctly rejected it.139 The apprehen-
sion underlying this argument is that plaintiffs will base defamation
claims on any remote or unreasonable inferences that they may extricate
from facially neutral statements."4
This fear is unfounded. It is for the court, not the plaintiff, to deter-
mine whether the challenged implication is reasonably susceptible of a
defamatory meaning."' If a defamatory implication is possible in lightof its context,142 the court should submit to the jury the issue of whether
136. See id. at 1308 (Bowman, J., dissenting); supra notes 44-106 and accompanying
text. The asserted interest in protecting defendants' free speech rights also involves pro-
tecting the public interest in open debate and free dissemination of ideas. Publication of
implicitly defamatory communications, however, does not necessarily further this goal.
The Federal Communications Commission has observed that "'[r]igging or slanting the
news is a most henious [sic] act against the public interest-indeed, there is no act more
harmful to the public's ability to handle its affairs.'" Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16, 19-
20 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
137. Compare Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1966) ("Even if a charge and
reference were merely implicit ... but a plaintiff could show by extrinsic proofs that the
statement referred to him, it would be no defense to a suit by one member of an identifi-
able group engaged in governmental activity that another was also attacked.") with Saenz
v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1316 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Although the Rosen-
blatt Court did not address directly an explicit charge requirement, it clearly contem-
plated a defamation action premised on something less than an 'explicit charge'
specifically leveled against the complaining official.... Nothing in New York Times or
Rosenblatt restricts the use of innuendo.").
138. Presumably, this argument derives from Sullivan's protection of false statements
about public figures made in public debate. If such statements merit first amendment
protection, the argument goes, then false and defamatory implications arising from true
statements should also be protected. Sullivan did reject the possibility that impersonal
criticism of a governmental entity be read as casting defamatory aspersions on members
of that entity. Neither it nor succeeding cases, however, precludes public figures from
demonstrating that the challenged defamation libelled them directly; not merely by asso-
ciation. See Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1315. Hence, directly libelling a public figure by implica-
tion stands on the same constitutional footing as directly libelling a public figure by an
explicit statement. See supra note 25.
139. See Southern Air Transp., Inc. v. ABC, 877 F.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Locricchio v. Evening News Ass'n, 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1473, 1475-76 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989); infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Woods v. Evansville Press Co., 791 F.2d 480, 488 (7th Cir. 1986) (no
evidence that defendants intended implications at issue); Note, supra note 43, at 830
(plaintiffs might base claims on unreasonable inferences).
141. See Southern Air, 877 F.2d at 1013-14; Saenz v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 841
F.2d 1309, 1313 (7th Cir. 1988); Woods, 791 F.2d at 486; W. Keeton, supra note 1, § 111,
at 774.
142. The defamatory meaning of words must be determined in reference to their con-
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any defamatory implication was actually conveyed to the average audi-
ence member.143 Only if the jury decides that the challenged implica-
tion 1" was false, defamatory and clearly apparent will the challenged
implication be actionable.145 Whether the defamatory implication hap-
pens to arise from true factual statements is irrelevant" because ulti-
mately the audience is left with a false impression that may eclipse the
statements' literal truth.147
B. Refining the Fact/Opinion Test
Applying the fact/opinion test to defamatory implications is inappro-
priate. Claims of defamation by implication scrutinized under the test
will almost invariably fail because an implication, inherently inexplicit
and cryptic, is not precise or verifiable. 48 Indeed, courts applying the
test invariably conclude that the alleged defamation is protected opin-
ion.'49 In effect, then, these courts disallow the cause of action.
Under Olman's version of the fact/opinion test, courts must consider
four factors. The first two require an analysis of the precision and ver-
text. See Sharon v. Time, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1162, 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Greenbelt
Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1970); R. Smolla, supra note 4,
§ 4.06(1), at 4-19.
143. The court apparently did just this in Newton v. NBC. See 677 F. Supp. 1066,
1067-68 (D. Nev. 1987); Brieffor Appellee, supra note 14, at 69. Accord Woods v. Evans-
ville Press Co., 791 F.2d 480, 486 (7th Cir. 1986) (where statement is reasonably suscepti-
ble of both defamatory and non-defamatory meanings, interpretation is matter for jury);
McNair v. Hearst Corp., 494 F.2d 1309, 1311 (9th Cir. 1974) (jury may infer defamatory
meaning from article).
144. Any concern that the jury will be unable to distinguish between statements and
the implications that arise from them is probably unfounded. In Newton, the jury's re-
sponses to special verdict questions demonstrated its ability to make the distinction. The
jury found that two of the three defendants were liable for making a defamatory state-
ment about the plaintiff, but that all three defendants were liable for conveying a defama-
tory implication about the plaintiff. Hence, "the jury discerned the separate requirements
posed by these questions and did not find that the requirements of one were encompassed
within those of the other." Brieffor Appellee, supra note 14, at 58-59 & n.60.
145. See, eg., Brieffor Appellee, supra note 14, at 70-71 & n.78 (jury based verdict for
plaintiff on three discrete, conspicuous implications).
146. See supra notes 107-130 and accompanying text. But see Mihalik v. Duprey, 11
Mass. App. Ct. 602, 605-06, 417 N.E.2d 1238, 1240-41 (1981) (true factual statements
cannot support action for defamation by implication).
147. Any argument that defamation by implication cannot seriously harm a plaintiff's
reputation is specious. Besides overlooking the potency of insinuation and the fact that
much of human communication is inexplicit, see infra notes 161-163 and accompanying
text, the argument ignores testimonial data on the lingering effect of defamatory implica-
tions. See McNair v. Hearst Corp., 494 F.2d 1309, 1311 n.2 (9th Cir. 1974); Brieffor
Appellee, supra note 14, at 88 n.105.
148. See supra notes 44-106 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 125-130 and
accompanying text.
149. See Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1438-45 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990); Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1248-51 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 324 (1989); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1305 (8th Cir.),




iflability of the challenged statements.1 50 The remaining factors contem-
plate the statement's literary and public contexts to determine whether
they signal to the audience that opinion is being offered.151 Because they
focus on the specific language of the statement, the precision and ver-
ifiability prongs of the test do not consider what is actually being chal-
lenged in these cases: the implication arising from that language.
Discussing the specificity factor, the court in Price v. Viking Penguin,
Inc. explained that statements or phrases susceptible of more than one
meaning cannot be deemed specific. 152 Because defamatory implications
may be interpreted differently by various people, this approach precludes
defamation actions predicated on implications.
In Janklow v. Newsweek Inc., for example, the court asserted that a
series of statements implying that the plaintiff began prosecuting Dennis
Banks because Banks filed rape charges against him was not sufficiently
precise in its implication.153 Had the statements indicated that the plain-
tiff "continued prosecuting" Banks after the charges were lodged, rather
than that he "was prosecuting" him after the accusation, the defamatory
implication would be almost impossible to draw.154 Because the state-
ments did not make that suggestion more explicit, the implications were
deemed fatally unspecific, even though the article's chronology clearly
suggested that revenge motivated the prosecution.155
The court further found that the implication was unverifiable. 56 The
plaintiff contended that the implication that he prosecuted Banks in retri-
bution was absolutely verifiable because he began prosecuting before the
rape charges were lodged against him.1 57 The court agreed, but found
that another interpretation of the statements was possible: the plaintiff,
as a newly appointed attorney general, may have continued the prosecu-
tion he had begun before his promotion in order to obtain revenge, han-
dling the case personally instead of recusing himself. Because different
inferences were possible, this implication failed the verifiability prong. 5 '
Under this sort of analysis, every inference that might be drawn from the
challenged statements would have to pass this prong. Such an approach
is clearly incorrect: the focus should be on the implication that the jury
finds a reasonable audience would understand.
A purely contextual analysis would avoid the inconsistencies of apply-
ing the full-blown fact/opinion test to defamatory implications. Omit-
ting the precision and verifiability prongs, this alternative approach
would apply only the contextual factors of the traditional test. Analyz-
150. See Secrist, 874 F.2d at 1248.
151. See id.
152. See Price, 881 F.2d at 1432.
153. See 788 F.2d 1300, 1303-04 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
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ing the implication in light of the underlying statement's literary and so-
cial contexts might reveal whether the implication more closely
resembles opinion than fact.
This approach is not without problems. Determining whether an im-
plication suggests fact or opinion is difficult, and any factors used in the
inquiry are necessarily inexact. Rejecting the fact/opinion dichotomy
entirely, however, would pose greater problems. Treating all defamatory
implications as assertions of fact rather than opinion would not comport
with the reality of human communication 15 9 and would eviscerate the
constitutional privilege for statements of opinion.
C. Policy Considerations Require Allowing Defamation by Implication
Disallowing defamation by implication ignores the reality of human
discourse. Communication, rarely composed of transparent assertions, is
a nexus of suggestions, cues, allusions, presumptions and intimations.
What speech leaves unsaid is often more potent than what it makes ex-
plicit:'" "it is the thought conveyed, not the words, that does the
harm."16 An offending word may be evanescent, but a defamatory im-
plication may linger.'62
Precluding a plaintiff from recovering for defamation that is cleverly
couched in implication is inequitable. It rewards a defendant for having
the foresight or literary facility to secrete a "classic and coolly-crafted
libel" in the overtones of a facially neutral statement. 163 It may provide a
loophole through which media defendants can escape liability for "high-
profile" defamatory stories by insinuating what they may not state.' 64
159. See infra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
160. According to the Saenz court, defamatory implications may be as clear and per-
haps more damaging than explicitly defamatory statements "because of their unlimited
nature." Saenz v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1314 (7th Cir. 1988).
161. Spiegel, Defamation by Implication-In the Confidential Manner, 29 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 306, 308 (1956) (quoting Turner v. Brien, 184 Iowa 320, 326, 167 N.W. 584, 586
(1918).
162. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
163. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting), cerL
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); see also Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1317 (Court did not believe
"that a publisher may, without impediment of law, trammel a public official by 'surrepti-
tious and insidious implication' under the pretense of governmental critique."); Woods v.
Evansville Press, 791 F.2d 480, 488 (7th Cir. 1986) ("As a result, the actual malice stan-
dard, as now applied, rewards a publisher or reporter for communicating a statement in a
surreptitious and invidious manner by implication.") (quoting Cochran v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 548, 563, 372 N.E.2d 1211, 1222 (1978)); Franklin &
Bussel, supra note 23, at 850 ("a rule that encourages evasive communication seems too
great a price to pay to achieve judicial economy").
In the context of defamatory broadcasts, rather than articles, defamatory implications
are conveyed not by carefully chosen words and delicately constructed implications, but
by the technological juxtaposition of audio and visual elements. See Southern Air
Transp., Inc. v. ABC, 877 F.2d 1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119, 1142 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993
(1988); Newton v. NBC, 677 F. Supp. 1066, 1067 (D. Nev. 1987).
164. This is a valid concern, given pressure within the media to produce what Bob
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Disallowing defamation by implication also limits the plaintiff's re-
course. In refuting an inexplicit or implied charge, the victim articulates,
and thereby accentuates, the charge against him.16
Allowing defamation by implication will not result in an avalanche of
meritless complaints. The actual malice standard is a hurdle166 that
plaintiffs who have been defamed by implication may be unable to
vault.167 Summary judgment mechanisms also greatly reduce the possi-
bility that the plaintiff will prevail.168 Finally, any danger that defend-
ants will be held liable for unwitting implications can be avoided by
Woodward has termed "holy shit stories." Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 817
F.2d 762, 796 n.48 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987); see also R.
Smolla, supra note 3, § 4.05(3), at 4-17 n.68 (defendant who intentionally inserts defama-
tory implication "between the lines" must be distinguished from defendant who uninten-
tionally defames by implication). For examples of deliberate attempts to mislead an
audience through insinuations that most readers or viewers will uncritically absorb, see
Mihalik v. Duprey, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 602, 607-08 n.3, 417 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 n.3 (1981)
and Spiegel, supra note 161, at 306.
165. A further problem is that the plaintiff's rebuttal subverts his own reputational
interests. Cf. Saenz v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1314 (7th Cir. 1988)
(one who is "soiled by the stain of defamatory innuendo is disadvantaged greatly in re-
sponding to the varying inferences that may be gleaned from inexact accusations"). As
the Gertz Court observed of explicit defamatory statements, "an opportunity for rebuttal
seldom suffices to undo harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is
rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie." Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974).
166. One study showed that plaintiffs suing media defendants prevailed in only five
percent of the cases, after all appeals. See Franklin, Suing the Media for Libel: A Litiga-
tion Study, 1981 Am. B. Found. Research J. 795, 797 [hereinafter Franklin, Suing the
Media]. Plaintiffs ultimately won judgments in 12 percent of non-media cases. See
Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 Am. B.
Found. Research J. 455, 476. Another study found that plaintiffs confronting the actual
malice standard won 47% of their cases in 1984. See Goodale, supra note 13, at 73-74.
167. In cases involving defamation by implication, the actual malice standard probably
provides an even greater hurdle than in typical defamation cases. As one court noted,
"[l]ogic fails when one defamed by [an implication] is required to show knowledge of or
reckless disregard for its falsity, when in fact it can rarely be proven that the author even
knew of the implication." Woods v. Evansville Press Co., 791 F.2d 480, 488 (7th Cir.
1986) (quoting Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 548, 563, 372
N.E.2d 1211, 1222 (1978)); see also Note, supra note 43, at 830 ("Plaintiffs bringing libel
actions on the basis of allegedly false, defamatory innuendo, rather than on the basis of
explicit and specific statements of fact, may be unlikely to present evidence sufficient to
create a triable issue of fact that defendants acted with the requisite fault.").
168. Defendants almost invariably move for summary judgment or to dismiss in defa-
mation cases. See Franklin, Suing the Media, supra note 166, at 801. Their efforts are
generally successful. See, eg., Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.
1989) (defendant won summary judgment motion), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990);
Southern Air Transp., Inc., v. ABC, 877 F.2d 1010, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (same); Secrist
v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1245 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 324 (1989);
Saenz v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1320 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); Woods v.
Evansville Press Co., 791 F.2d 480, 481 (7th Cir. 1986) (same); Janklow v. Newsweek,
Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1301-02 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Pierce v.
Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 510 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 861 (1978); see also The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Leading Cases, 100 Harv.
L. Rev. 100, 255 (1986) (Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. may make summary judgment
more accessible when movant's opponent bears higher evidentiary burden).
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requiring clear and convincing proof that a defendant intended the impli-
cation at issue.'69 Defendants can request additional instructions forbid-
ding the jury to draw an inference of intent solely from the fact of
broadcast itself.170 This would ensure that verdicts are based only on
probative circumstantial evidence of intent.1 71
CONCLUSION
Courts have interpreted the recent constitutionalization of defamation
law as precluding defamation by implication. Sullivan and succeeding
cases, however, do not suggest that a defendant who defames implicitly is
immune from liability. Neither does the Constitution compel differentia-
tion between implicit and explicit defamation. Dismissing claims based
on defamatory implications penalizes plaintiffs for the defendant's artful-
ness, undermines state interests in protecting reputation and fails to ad-
vance free speech interests. Allowing claims of defamation by
implication will accord proper weight to reputational concerns and cali-
brate the current imbalance that favors defendants.
Nicole Alexandra LaBarbera
169. Amici Curiae in Newton conceded that "[tihe most obvious unintended impres-
sions are excised in the editing process." See BriefforAppellee, supra note 14, at 63 n.69
(emphasis added). Requiring excision of intended implications, therefore, would hardly
be an undue burden. As two well-known commentators observe, "by basing liability on
the defendant's awareness of the statement's defamatory meaning, a court could spare a
defendant who unintentionally defamed another, while at the same time impos[ing] liabil-
ity on a defendant who intentionally defamed through implication." Franklin & Bussel,
supra note 23, at 850.
170. See Brieffor Appellee, supra note 14, at 63.
171. For examples of probative circumstantial evidence, see Newton v. NBC, 677 F.
Supp. 1066, 1067-68 (D. Nev. 1987); Brieffor Appellee, supra note 14, at 65-66.
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